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UNION PARTICIPATION IN OSHRC HEARINGS
In response to government and industry's failure to reduce the number
and severity of workplace injuries and illnesses, Congress in 1970 enacted the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act or the Act).' To effectuate the
Act's purpose of ensuring workers a safe and healthy working environment, 2
Congress empowered the Secretary of Labor (the Secretary) to promulgate
safety and health standards 3 to which all employers affecting interstate com-
merce must comply." Under the authority of the Secretary, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducts on-site workplace in-
spections to monitor employer compliance with the promulgated standards.5
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982)). Congress enacted the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSH Act or the Act) in response to a congressional finding that occupational in-
juries and illnesses burdened substantially interstate commerce in terms of lost production and
wages, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments. See id. § 651(a); see also S.
REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177,
5178-81 (congressional finding that vast numbers of American workers suffer from exposure to
wide variety of serious safety and health hazards). The Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare noted that workplace safety and health had deteriorated markedly during the years pre-
ceeding the Act's passage in 1970. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in
1970 U.S CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178-80. The Committee stated that the efforts of in-
dustry and state government had failed to prevent the increase in industrial injury and disease,
resulting in the need for a comprehensive nationwide approach to occupational safety and health.
Id. at 5180.
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1982) (purpose of Occupational Safety and Health Act is to as-
sure workers safe and healthful working conditions); S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177 (purpose of Occupational Safety and
Health Act is to reduce number and severity of work-related injuries and illnesses).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1982) (Secretary shall promulgate occupational safety and health
standards).
4. 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1982). Section 654(a)(1) of the Act requires each employer to furnish
his employees a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to the employees. Id. Section 654(a)(2) requires each em-
ployer to comply with the occupational safety and health standards promulgated under the OSH
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2)(1982); see id. § 652(5) ("employer" means person engaged in inter-
state commerce who has employees, excluding United States, State, or Local governments).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1982) (Secretary of Labor has authority to inspect and investigate
places of employment); 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1983) (Compliance Safety and Health Officers of
Department of Labor authorized to enter and inspect employers' premises); see 29 U.S.C. §
657(f)(1982) (employees may request inspections); W. CONNOLLY & D. CROWELL, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, § 1.01, at 1-2 (Rev. ed. 1982) (inspec-
tions triggered either by complaint about unsafe working conditions or in accordance with
routine schedule of inspections); see also, e.g., Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 926 (2d Cir. 1983) (Secretary of Labor has broad enforcement powers
under OSH Act); Marshall v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 635 F.2d 544, 550
(6th Cir. 1980) (Secretary of Labor is exclusive prosecutor of OSH Act); W. CONNOLLY & D.
CROWELL, supra, § 1.01 at 1-2 (OSH Act vests Secretary of Labor with general responsibility to
enforce Act while Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) functions as chief ad-
ministrator of Act).
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If OSHA's inspection discloses any health or safety violations, the Secretary
will issue to the employer a citation which specifies the violations found and
the period of time granted to abate the violation. 6 Under section 10(c) of the
Act an employer may elect to contest a citation in a hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge appointed by the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC or the Commission).' Section 10(c) also per-
mits employees or their representative unions to initiate a hearing to contest a
citation, but only on the ground that the period of abatement specified in the
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a)(1976). Section 9(a) of the Act states that if the Secretary or his
authorized representative believes that an employer has committed a health or safety violation,
the Secretary must issue promptly a citation to the employer. Id. Section 9(a) requires that each
citation must be in writing, must describe with particularity the nature of the violation, and must
include a reference to the provision of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or order allegedly
violated. Id. Citations also must fix a reasonable time for the employer to abate the violation.
Id.; see also W. CONNOLLY & D. CROWELL, supra note 5, § 1.01 at 1-2 to 1-3 (discussing OSHA
citations for safety and health violations); Kamer, Employee Participation in Settlement Negotia-
tions and Proceedings before the OSHRC, 31 LABOR L.J. 208, 210 (1980) (discussing OSHA cita-
tions). The Secretary of Labor also has the authority to impose monetary penalties against an
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)(1982). Section 10(c) provides:
If an employer notifies the Secretary that he intends to contest a citation ... or if,
within fifteen working days of the issuance of a citation ... any employee or repre-
sentative of employees files a notice with the Secretary alleging that the period of time
fixed in the citation for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable, the Secretary
shall immediately advise the Commission of such notification, and the Commission
shall afford an opportunity for a hearing.... The Commission shall thereafter issue
an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's
citation or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief, and such order shall
become final thirty days after its issuance. Upon a showing by an employer of a good
faith effort to comply with the abatement requirements of a citation, and that abate-
ment has not been completed because of factors beyond his reasonable control, the
Secretary, after an opportunity for a hearing as provided in this subsection, shall issue
an order affirming or modifying the abatement requirements in such citation. The
rules of procedure prescribed by the Commission shall provide affected employees or
representatives of affected employees an opportunity to participate as parties to hear-
ings under this subsection.
29 U.S.C. § 659(c)(1976).
Section 659(a) states that within a reasonable time after the termination of an OSHA inspec-
tion, the Secretary shall notify the inspected employer of any penalty imposed and inform the
employer that he has 15 working days within which to notify the Secretary that the employer
wishes to contest the citation or proposed penalty. Id. § 659(a). If within 15 days the employer
fails to notify the Secretary that he intends to contest the citation or proposed penalty and no em-
ployee or employee representative files a notice to challenge the reasonableness of the abatement
period specified in the citation, the citation will be deemed a final and unreviewable order of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or the Commission). Id. Section
659(b) provides that if the Secretary has reason to believe that an employer has failed to correct a
violation for which the Secretary has issued a citation, the Secretary shall notify the employer of
his failure to correct the violation and inform the employer that he has 15 working days within
which to notify the Secretary that the employer intends to contest the citation or proposed penal-
ty. Id. § 659(b). If the employer fails to notify the Secretary within 15 days that the employer
wishes to challenge the citation or penalty, the citation or penalty will become a final OSHRC
order. Id. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2200.60 to .76 (1983) (OSHRC hearing procedures); Kamer,
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citation is unreasonable in length.8 Additionally, section 10(c), allows
employees or their unions to participate as parties to employer-initiated hear-
ings. 9 Section 10 (c), however, is unclear regarding what objections unions
may raise to a citation in a hearing initiated by an employer.' 0 Circuit courts
interpreting section 10(c) differ over whether unions in an employer-initiated
hearing may challenge a citation on all matters relevant to the citation or
merely on the ground that the period of abatement specified in the citation is
unreasonably long." The Department of Labor and OSHRC, the two agen-
cies charged with administering the Act, also disagree on this point.' 2
The judicial and administrative disagreement concerning the scope of
union participation in employer-initiated hearings turns on the uncertain rela-
tionship between two sentences in section 10(c).' 3 In one sentence, section
10(c) provides that employees or their representatives may initiate a hearing
only on the ground that "the period of time fixed in the citation for the abate-
ment of a violation is unreasonable.""' In reference to employer-initiated
supra note 6, at 211-13 (OSHRC procedure); W. CONNOLLY& D. CROwELL, supra note 5, § 1.01
at 1-3 (OSHRC procedure).
OSHRC consists of a three member board appointed by the President, each for a term of six
years. 29 U.S.C. §§ 661(a)-(b) (1982). Congress empowered the Chairman of OSHRC to appoint
as many administrative law judges as the Chairman deems necessary to adjudicate contested cita-
tions. Id. § 661(d). An employer who disagrees with an administrative law judge's decision may
petition the Commission for discretionary review. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91(a) (1983) (person ag-
grieved by decision of administrative law judge may petition OSHRC for review); id. §
2200.92(a) (1983) (OSHRC has discretion to review administrative law judge's decision). If still
dissatisfied, an employer may appeal to a federal circuit court. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1982).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982). Section 10(c) of the OSH Act states that OSHRC must
grant employees or their representatives a hearing if the employees or union file a notice of con-
test alleging that the period for abatement of the violation fixed in the citation is unreasonable in
length. Id.; see supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)); see also, e.g., Donovan v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic
Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (5th Cir. 1983) (union may initiate hearing only to contest
reasonableness of period of abatement); Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1983) (union-initiated contests limited to reasonableness
of abatement period); Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir.)
(employees may challenge citation only on ground that period of abatement is too long), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); see supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982). Section 10(c) does not make clear whether unions as par-
ties to employer-initiated contests may object to citations only on the ground that the period of
abatement specified in the citation is unreasonable or whether § 10(c) permits unions to par-
ticipate fully in the litigation. See id.; supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)); infra text accompanying
notes 13-16 (discussing ambiguity inherent in § 10(c)); see also Kamer, supra note 6, at 211-13 (§
10(c) is ambiguous regarding degree of participation Act permits employees to enjoy in employer-
initiated hearings).
11. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority between cir-
cuit courts concerning scope of employee participation in employer-initiated hearings).
12. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text (Secretary of Labor argues § 10(c) permits
unions as parties to employer-initiated hearings to object only to reasonableness of abatement
period). But see notes 24-29 and accompanying text (OSHRC maintains union may participate
fully in employer-initiated contests under § 10(c)).
13. See infra note 16 and text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing ambiguity inherent in
§ 10(c)).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); see supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)).
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hearings, another sentence of section 10(c) states that "[tihe rules of proced-
ure prescribed by the Commission shall provide affected employees or repre-
sentatives of affected employees an opportunity to participate as parties to
hearings under this subsection.' ' 5 Section 10(c) does not reveal whether the
language in the former sentence that limits the range of objections upon
which unions may initiate a hearing also qualifies the right to participate as
parties to employer-initiated hearings conferred upon unions in the latter sen-
tence.' 6 Neither the legislative history of the Act" nor the rules promulgated
under the Act'8 state expressly the degree of participation in OSHRC hearings
Congress intended employees and their unions to enjoy.
The Secretary of Labor maintains that Congress intended employees and
organized labor to play only a limited role in the enforcement of the Act.'9
The Secretary contends that the language in section 10(c) limiting unions to
challenging only the reasonableness of an abatement period applies to union
participatory rights in employer-initiated as well as employee-initiated hear-
ings. 20 The Secretary asserts that because Congress vested the Secretary of
Labor with the exclusive authority to prosecute the OSH Act, a broader inter-
pretation of section 10(c) that permits unions to participate fully in OSHRC
hearings would result in an impermissible infringement upon the Secretary's
15. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); see supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); see also supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)). The relationship
between the sentence in § 10(c) allowing employees to initiate a hearing on the ground that the
period of abatement fixed in the citation is unreasonable and the sentence providing employees
with the right to participate as parties in employer-initiated hearings is unclear. See 29 U.S.C. §
659(c) (1982).
One commentator believes that the latter sentence seems to suggest that employees enjoy a
less restricted role in employer-initiated hearings than in hearings the employees initiate. Kamer,
supra note 6, at 211. This commentator states that the question § 10(c) raises is whether the term
"parties" means full parties able to contest all aspects of a citation or limited parties permitted to
contest only the period of abatement specified in a citation. See id. Nowhere in the Act has Con-
gress set the parameters of employee participation in OSHRC hearings. See id.
17. S. REP. No. 1982, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5177, 5191; see infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (legislative history unclear
regarding whether OSH Act qualifies employees' right to participate in parties to employer-
initiated hearings).
18. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20 (1983). The rules promulgated under § 10(c) contain two
subsections that address employee participatory rights in OSHRC hearings. See id. In one subsec-
tion, the rules state that "affected employees may elect to participate as parties" in Commission
hearings. See id. § 2200.20(a). This subsection does not state whether employees may participate
as parties in employer-initiated hearings only on the issue of the reasonableness of the abatement
period or on any issue relevant to the citation. See id. Only the subsection in the rules that ad-
dresses employee-initiated contests limits expressly the grounds upon which employees may
challenge a citation, providing that employees or their representatives may file a notice of contest
"with respect to the reasonableness of the period for abatement of a violation." See id. §
2200.20(b).
19. See Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1352 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Secretary asserts employees' role in enforcement of Act limited to that of "gadfly"); Marshall v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 635 F.2d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 1980) (Secretary
claims to be sole prosecutor under Act).
20. See, e.g., Donovan v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 722 F.2d 1158 (4th
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prosecutorial discretion.2 1 Nothing in the Act or its legislative history justifies
such an expansive view of union participatory rights, maintains the
Secretary. 2 Additionally, the Secretary contends that his exclusive authority
to prosecute violations of the Act necessarily includes the power to settle cita-
tions with an employer, without the need to entertain union objections to any
element of the settlement agreement other than the reasonableness of the
period of abatement.
23
OSHRC, however, believes that section 10(c) entitles unions to plenary
participation as parties to employer-initiated hearings.24 The Commission
reasons that Congress included the term "parties" in section 10(c) intending
that OSHRC and the courts give "parties" its legal meaning, that of persons
Cir. 1983) (Secretary asserts employees and unions may challenge only reasonableness of abate-
ment period specified in citation in employer-initiated hearings); Donovan v. Oil, Chem.'&
Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1983) (Secretary contends employee participation
in employer-initiated hearings limited to matters concerning reasonableness of abatement
period); Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir.
1983) (Secretary maintains union in employer-initiated hearing limited to contesting
reasonableness of period of abatement).
21. See Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 925 (2d
Cir. 1983) (Secretary asserts OSHRC's view that § 10(c) permits full union participation in Com-
mission hearings infringes on Secretary's prosecutorial discretion); Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD
(CCH) 26,187, at 33,026 (No. 4386, 1982) (Secretary argues § 10(c) must be read narrowly to
accomodate Secretary's prosecutorial discretion), rev'd sub. nom. Donovan v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. See Donovan v, Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 925 (2d
Cir. 1983) (Secretary contends OSHRC's interpretation of § 10(c) allowing employees to par-
ticipate fully in Commission hearings is contrary to language of Act and its legislative history).
23. See Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Secretary contends employees and unions may not object to settlement agreement on grounds
other than reasonableness of period of abatement); Marshall v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers,
647 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981) (Secretary asserts OSHRC's refusal to approve settlement agree-
ment over union's objection that abatement had not occurred infringed Secretary's prosecutorial
discretion).
24. See Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,025 (No. 4386, 1982) (section
10(c) permits all parties to litigate fully contest initiated by Secretary's citation to employer),
rev'd sub. nom. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n 713 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1983). Prior to 1982, OSHRC maintained that § 10(c) limits a union's role as a party to an
employer-initiated contest to objecting only to the reasonableness of the length of the abatement
period. See United States Steel Corp., 1976-77 OSHD (CCH) 21,463, at 25,742 (No. 2975,
1977) (section 10(c) permits union to object to OSHA citation only on ground that length of
abatement period specified in citation is unreasonable); United Auto Workers, Local 588 (Ford
Motor Co.) 1976-77 OSHD (CCH) 20,737, at 24,865 (No. 2786, 1976) (employees' participa-
tion in employer-initiated hearings under § 10(c) limited to contesting only reasonableness of
abatement period), aff'd, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977). In 1982, a reconstituted Commission
reinterpreted § 10(c) and determined that Congress had granted employees and their unions
plenary participation in employer-initiated hearings. See Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH)
26,187, at 33,029 (No. 4386, 1982) (Commission overruled United States Steel to extent it held
employee party status is statutorily limited to contesting reasonableness of abatement period),
rev'd sub. nom. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1982). The Mobil Oil Commission reasoned that the principal error of earlier OSHRC deci-
sions was the Commission's failure to recognize the statutory distinction between contesting par-
ties and intervening parties. Id. at 33,028. The Mobil Oil Commission determined that the
language in § 10(c) limiting employee rights to initiate a hearing does not apply to the par-
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entitled to participate fully in litigation." The Commission notes that neither
the Act nor the Commission rule enabling employees to elect party status
qualifies the union right to participate as parties granted in the last sentence
of section 10(c). 26 OSHRC also rejects the Secretary's argument that unfet-
tered union participation in OSHRC hearings would constitute a usurpation
of the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion.2 7 The Secretary's prosecutorial dis-
cretion is not unlimited, contends the Commission, and must be balanced
against the employees' interest in participating meaningfully in hearings
OSHRC conducts primarily for the benefit of employees.2 8 The Commission
ticipatory rights employees enjoy under § 10(c) when intervening in employer-initiated contests.
Id. at 33,029; see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's interpreta-
tion of § 10(c) in Mobil Oil).
25. See Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,023 (No. 4386, 1982) (Con-
gress employed legal term "parties" expecting that Commission would give term its legal mean-
ing), rev'd sub. nom. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918
(2d Cir. 1982).
26. Id. at 33,022. The Mobil Oil Commission noted that employees have intimate
knowledge of their working conditions and thus, may possess significant information to offer the
Commission concerning the alleged violations and the most appropriate forms of relief. Id. at
33,025. Additionally, OSHRC stated that the Commission's order will determine the employees'
interests in a safe and healthful workplace. Id. The Commission reasoned that if OSHRC's deci-
sion leaves the safety hazard unremedied, employees will be forced to file an entirely new com-
plaint with the Secretary, in order to claim that the employer's premises are unsafe notwithstand-
ing the Commission's determination. Id. This result, maintained the Commission, would
generate needless and wasteful relitigation. Id. Even worse, speculated OSHRC, was the
possibility that the doctrine of res judicata would bar a new action since the issues and parties in
the new action would be identical to those in the old action. Id.
27. See id. at 33,026-028. The Mobil Oil Commission stated that the Secretary's argument
that § 10(c) must be read narrowly to accomodate the Secretary's "prosecutorial discretion"
overlooked the fundamental distinction between the initiation of enforcement proceedings and
employee participation in adjudicatory hearings. Id. at 33,026. The Commission stated that the
Secretary enjoys unqualified prosecutorial authority to initiate enforcement proceedings by issu-
ing citations. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982) (Secretary has authority to issue citations); id. §
657(f(2) (employees not authorized to issue citations); id. § 653(b)(4) (OSH Act creates no in-
dependent cause of action for employees against employers who violate safety standards); see
also id. § 657(a) (Secretary has discretion to investigate workplace hazards); id. § 655(e)
(Secretary has discretion to mitigate penalties). The Commission noted that the Secretary's exer-
cises of discretion in issuing citations, investigating workplace hazards, and mitigating penalties
are not subject to direct administrative review. Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187 at
33,026 n.21. Once, however, an employer initiated a hearing to contest a citation, OSHRC main-
tained that the Act enters its adjudicatory phase and the Secretary's exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in issuing the citation becomes the central issue before the Commission. Id. at 33,027.
The Mobil Oil Commission stated that by allowing employees to intervene and participate as par-
ties to an employer-initiated hearing, the OSH Act permits employees to protect any interests
they may deem adverse to those of the Secretary as well as those of the employer. See id. OSHRC
maintained that the mere existence of the Secretary's enforcement discretion does not limit the
statutory status of intervening employees, but rather that the adverse interests of all the parties
are to be adjudicated in a hearing independent of the Secretary's investigatory and enforcement
discreti6n. See id.
28. See Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,028. (Secretary's discretion




further maintains that unions may challenge before OSHRC a settlement
reached between the Secretary and an employer on any ground relevant to the
settlement.
29
A majority of circuit courts reject OSHRC's interpretaton of sec-
tion 10(c) in favor of the Secretary's position.3" The Second,3 Third, 32
29. See id. at 33,029-033 (administrative law judge in employer-initiated hearing must con-
sider intervening union's objections to all aspects of settlement agreement before approving set-
tlement).
30. See infra notes 31-34 and notes 38-60 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court
cases that follow Secretary's view that § 10(c) limits employee participation in employer-initiated
hearings to matters concerning only reasonableness of abatement period).
31. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 926, 929
(2d Cir. 1983) (court held that union may not use party status under § 10(c) to contest effec-
tiveness of abatement plan); see infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text (discussion of Donovan
court's interpretation of § 10(c)).
32. See Marshall v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 647 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1981)
(OSHRC has jurisdiction in employer-initiated hearing to consider union objections only to
reasonableness of abatement period); Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176,
1186 (3d Cir.) (unions in employer-initiated hearings may contest only reasonableness of abate-
ment period), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980). In Marshall v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
(OCA W), the Secretary cited the employer for certain safety violations. 647 F.2d at 385. The
employer filed a notice of contest and OSHRC instituted a hearing in which the union elected
party status. Id. Thereafter, the Secretary submitted a proposed settlement to the employer and
the union. Id. Only the employer signed the settlement agreement, which provided in principal
part that the condition which led to the citation had already abated. Id. The Secretary forwarded
the agreement to the administrative law judge in charge of the enforcement hearing, who
approved the settlement as submitted. Id. The union objected to the administrative law judge's
approval of the settlement, contending that, contrary to the settlement, the employer had not
cured the alleged violation. Id. The Commission construed the union's written objection as a
petition for discretionary review and acceded to the union's petition. Id. The Commission deter-
mined that under § 10(c), the union possessed the right to challenge the settlement's assertion
that the employer had abated the hazard and remanded the case to the administrative law judge
to determine whether in fact the employer had cured the violation. Id. at 386. The Secretary ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit the Commission's order to remand the case to the administrative law
judge. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit in Marshall v. OCA W reversed the Commission's order, find-
ing that OSHRC had erroneously refused to approve the Secretary's settlement agreement. Id. at
387-88. The Third Circuit determined that the Secretary, as exclusive prosecutor of the OSH Act,
possessed the unfettered discretion to settle cases. Id. at 388. Otherwise, reasoned the Third Cir-
cuit, if settlements approved by administrative law judges were subject to Commission review
and rejection, settlement agreements would have no finality, thus discouraging employers from
settling contested citations. Id. at 387. Moreover, the Third Circuit determined that the language
in § 10(c) limiting employees to initiating a hearing only to contest the reasonableness of the
abatement period similarly qualifies the union's right to participate as parties in employer-
initiated hearings. See id. at 387-88. The Marshall v. OCA W court followed the Third Circuit's
earlier holding in Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co. that employees under § 10(c) possess
no right to be heard on matters other than the reasonableness of the abatement period in
employer initiated hearings as well as in settlement hearings. See id. at 388; Marshall v. Sun
Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir.) (employees as parties to employer-
initiated hearings may contest only reasonableness of abatement period), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1061 (1980). The Marshall v. OCA W court therefore, held that because the union had objected
not to the reasonableness of the period of abatement fixed in the citation, but rather to the fact
19841 1417
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Fourth3 3 and Sixth 34 Circuits agree with the Secretary of Labor that under sec-
of abatement itself, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain the union's challenge to the
settlement. 647 F.2d at 388.
In Sun Petroleum, the union, as a party to an employer-initiated contest, objected to a set-
tlement reached between the Secretary and the employer on the ground that the methods of
abatement specified in the settlement would not correct the safety hazard that was the subject of
the original citation. See 622 F.2d at 1178. In a prehearing conference, the administrative law
judge assigned to the case determined that the union lacked standing to contest the settlement on
any matters beyond the reasonableness of the abatement period fixed in the settlement. Id. at
1178-79. Only two of the three OSHRC members reviewed the administrative law judge's deci-
sion. Id. at 1179. The two OSHRC members disagreed on whether the union under § 10(c) could
object to the substantive elements of the settlement agreement. Id. OSHRC therefore affirmed
the administrative law judge's approval of the settlement, but accorded the judge's order only the
precedential value of an unreviewed administrative law judge decision. See id. Both the Secretary
and the union appealed the Commission's inconclusive decision to the Third Circuit. Id.
On appeal, the Sun Petroleum court rejected the union's petition for review, agreeing with
the Secretary that § 10(c) does not permit unions to contest the substantive merits of a settlement
agreement. Id. at 1186, 1188. The Third Circuit rejected the union's contention that § 10(c)
allows employees or their unions to participate fully in OSHRC hearings, as well as to challenge
settlement agreements on any relevant grounds. See id. at 1186. The Sun Petroleum court found
that the Act's legislative history establishes clearly that § 10(c) permits unions in all OSHRC
hearings to object to a citation only on the ground that the abatement period specified in a cita-
tion is unreasonably long. See id. (citing legislative history of OSH Act); see also S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. - , reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191
(congressional discussion of § 10(c)); infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of § 10(c)). But see Sun Petroleum Products, 622 F.2d at 1188-93 (Pollak, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent in Sun Petroleum disagreed with the majority that under § 10(c) unions have no
right to participate in employer-initiated hearings on matters other than the reasonableness of the
abatement period. Id. at 1188. The dissent noted that § 10(c) creates two types of hearings, those
an employer initiates and those employees initiate. Id. at 1189; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (§
10(c)); see also supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)); supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (section
10(c) is ambiguous concerning scope of employee participation in employer-initiated hearings).
The Sun Petroleum dissent stated that § 10(c) limits contesting the reasonableness of abatement
periods only in employee-initiated hearings. 622 F.2d at 1189 (Pollak, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent determined that the last line in § 10(c) grants employees the un-
qualified right to intervene and "participate as parties" in employer-initiated hearings. Id.; see
29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (section 10(c)); see also supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)). The dissent re-
jected the majority's assertion that the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to limit
employee participation in all OSHRC hearings, finding that the legislative history indicates that
Congress created a two-tiered adjudicatory structure in which employee participation is limited to
matters concerning the length of the period of abatement only in employee-initiated contests. See
622 F.2d at 1190 (Pollak, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Act's legislative
history); see also S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5191 (legislative history of § 10(c)); infra notes 120-29 and accompany-
ing text (discussing legislative history of § 10(c)). Moreover, the Sun Petroleum dissent maintain-
ed that employees possess standing to object to settlements reached in employer-initiated hearings
on all matters relevant to the settlements. 622 F.2d at 1191 (Pollak, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
33. See Donovan v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 12610, 722 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir.
1983) (court upheld Secretary's view that union may not object to substantive merits of settle-
ment agreement). In Donovan v. United Steelworkers, the employer, after contesting a citation,
reached a settlement agreement with the Secretary. Id. at 2-3. The union, which had elected party
status in the hearing, objected to the settlement on grounds other than the reasonableness of the
1418
OSHRC HEARINGS
10(c), unions as parties to employer-initiated hearings may contest a citation
only on the ground that the period of abatement specified in the citation is
unreasonably long. The Fifth3" and District of Columbia 36 Circuits, on the
other hand, follow the Commission's view that employees and their unions
abatement period fixed in the settlement. Id. The administrative law judge assigned to the case
ordered a hearing to entertain the union's objections to the settlement. Id. at 3. The Commission
affirmed the administrative lav judge's order and the Secretary appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
Id.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated OSHRC's order to the administrative law judge to
hear the union's objections, agreeing with the Secretary that under § 10(c), the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to entertain union objections to settlements on grounds beyond the reasonableness of
the abatement period specified in the settlement. Id. at 5. Without engaging in lengthy analysis,
the United Steelworkers court followed the Second Circuit's conclusion in Donovan v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm'n that § 10(c) restricts union participation in employer-
initiated hearings as well as objections to settlement agreements to matters concerning the
reasonableness of the period of abatement. See id. (adopting Second Circuit's rationale and con-
clusions in Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n); Donovan v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, 713 F.2d 918, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1983) (last line in
§ 10(c) granting employees party status in employer-initiated hearings does not confer right to
object to citations on grounds other than reasonableness of length of period of abatement); see
also infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's narrow interpretation
of § 10(c) in Donovan).
34. See Marshall v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 635 F.2d 544, 551 (6th
Cir. 1980) (court concluded that § 10(c) permits employees to contest only reasonableness of
abatement period specified in citations). In Marshall v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n the Secretary issued a ctiation to an employer alleging several OSH Act violations. Id.
at 546. The employer filed a notice to contest the citation. Id. Subsequently, the Secretary deter-
mined that the citation was unwarranted and filed a motion with the administrative law judge
assigned to the hearing to vacate the citation. Id. Over the union's objection, the administrative
law judge granted the Secretary's motion. Id. The Commission vacated the administrative law
judge's decision and remanded the case to him for further proceedings, holding that when the
Secretary decides not to prosecute a citation, affected employees may proceed to prosecute the
citation if the employees elect party status in the original hearing. Id. The Secretary and the
employer appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Id.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Commission's decision, holding that once the Sec-
retary withdraws a contested OSHA citation, affected employees or their union may not proceed
to prosecute the citation. Id. The Sixth Circuit construed § 10(c) to limit employees in employer as
well as employee-initiated hearings to contesting only the reasonableness of the abatement period
specified in citations. See id. at 551. The Sixth Circuit found that the length of the abatement
period is the only matter upon which employees may infringe upon the Secretary's prosecutorial
discretion in OSHRC hearings. Id. Only the employer, stated the Sixth Circuit, may contest other
elements of a citation. Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that, therefore, employees have no stan-
ding to object to the Secretary's withdrawal of a citation. Id.
35. See Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1351 (5th Cir. 1983)
(employees who elect party status in employer-initiated hearings may litigate fully merits of cita-
tion); see infra notes 70-114 and accompanying text (discussion of Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of § 10(c) in Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers).
36. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
671 F.2d 643, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (OSHRC has jurisdiction in employer-initiated hearings to
entertain employees' objections on all matters relating to citation in question), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 206 (1982); see infra note 87 (discussing District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of
§ 10(c)).
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enjoy unlimited participatory rights in employer-initiated hearings. These two
circuits, however, stop short of adopting OSHRC's position in its entirety and
hold that settlement agreements are subject to union objections concerning
only the reasonableness of the abatement period."
The Second Circuit case of Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission" perhaps best articulates the majority interpretation of
section 10(c). In Donovan, a union member and employee of Mobil Oil Cor-
poration died of asphyxiation while gauging the level of petroleum in a hold-
ing tank at a Mobil facility." The union immediately notified OSHA, which
inspected the facility. 0 As a result of the OSHA inspection, the Secretary is-
sued a citation charging Mobil with a serious violation of section 5(a)(1) of
the Act.41 Section 5(a)(1), known as the "general duty" clause, requires em-
ployers to furnish their employees a place of employment free from recog-
nized hazards likely to kill or seriously harm the employees. 42 The citation
proposed that Mobil immediately abate the violation and assessed the com-
pany a $540 penalty.4 3 Pursuant to section 10(c), Mobil filed a notification of
its intent to contest the citation. 44 OSHRC assigned an administrative law
judge to adjudicate an enforcement hearing and the union, as employee repre-
sentative, elected to participate as a party in the proceeding.
45
Before the hearing commenced, however, the Secretary and Mobil
reached a proposed settlement which they submitted to the administrative law
judge for approval.4" The union filed an objection with the administratve law
judge, claiming that the settlement would not abate the hazardous condition
at the Mobil facility.47 The administrative law judge approved the settlement
37. See Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1983)
(court held employees have no standing to object to settlement agreements on grounds other than
reasonableness of abatement period specified in settlement); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 671 F.2d 643, 650 n.7 (D.C. Cir.) (when
Secretary settles citation in exchange for employer's withdrawal of notice of contest employees
may contest only reasonableness of period of abatement fixed in settlement), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 206 (1982); infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit's refusal in
Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers to find that § 10(c) permits employees to contest
substantive elements of settlement agreement).
38. 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 920.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982); see 713 F.2d at 920 n.2 (section 5(a)(1) known as Act's
"general duty" clause).
43. 713 F.2d at 920. The citation the Secretary issued to Mobil alleged that Mobil required
its workers to manually gauge and sample the petroleum in floating roof tanks without proper at-
mospheric testing, contact with other personnel, or adequate training. Id. at 920 n.l.
44. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)).
45. 713 F.2d at 920.
46. Id. The rules promulgated under the OSH Act provide that the Secretary must submit
settlement proposals to the administrative law judge assigned to adjudicate the enforcement hear-
ing for approval. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.100 (1983). The administrative law judge shall approve the
settlement if it is consistent with the provisions and policies of the Act. Id.
47. 713 F.2d at 920-21.
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over the union's objection, holding that the union, under section 10(c), had
standing to object to a settlement only on the reasonableness of the length of
the abatement period specified in the settlement.4 8 OSHRC granted the
union's request for discretionary review and remanded the case to the admin-
istrative law judge with instructions to conduct a hearing to determine the
merit of the union's objections to the proposed methods of abatement in the
settlement agreement.4 9 The Commission rejected the administrative law
judge's interpretation of section 10(c) and held that the union, as a party to
an employer-initiated hearing, could contest the proposed settlement on any
grounds relevant to the settlement.5 0 The Secretary appealed OSHRC's order
to the Second Circuit."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed OSHRC's holding and vacated
the remand order.52  In order to discern how to interpret section 10(c)
properly, the Second Circuit first examined the scheme of the Act to deter-
mine the respective roles that Congress intended the Secretary and employees
to play in policing employer compliance with OSHA standards." The
Donovan court found that Congress granted the Secretary broad rulemaking,
investigatory and enforcement powers." Although Congress endowed em-
ployees with special rights in the rulemaking and investigatory stages of the
OSH Act, the Second Circuit found that Congress intended that employees
exercise only a limited role in the Act's enforcement.5 5 The Donovan court de-
clared that the OSH Act's detailed statutory scheme led unmistakeably to the
48. Id. at 922.
49. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1982) (Commission may review administrative law judge's
findings).
50. 713 F.2d at 922. The Commission in Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n held that the administrative law judge wrongly determined that the language in § 10(c)
limiting employee participatory rights in employee-initiated hearings also applied to employer-
initiated hearings. Id.; see Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,021 (No. 4386,
1982) (Commission's rationale in Donovan), rev'd sub. nom, Donovan v. Occupation Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983).
51. 713 F.2d at 919-20.
52. Id. at 931.
53. See id. at 926-27 (court examined legislative scheme of OSH Act).
54. See id. at 926. In Donovan, the Second Circuit noted that the Secretary's broad powers
include the authority to promulgate occupational safety and health standards, modify or grant
variances from standards, inspect and investigate workplaces, issue citations and propose
penalties against employers, seek enforcement of OSHRC orders, seek injunctions to restrain im-
minent dangers, and prosecute contested citations before the Commission. Id.; see supra notes
3-6 (discussing Secretary's statutory powers under OSH Act).
55. See 713 F.2d at 926. In Donovan, the Second Circuit determined that the Act permits
employees to participate in rulemaking proceedings. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(2)-(3) (1982)
("interested persons" may comment upon or object to Secretary's proposed promulgation,
modification, or revocation of safety or health standards). The Donovan court also noted that
employees may request the Secretary to conduct a workplace inspection to examine a suspected
hazard. See 713 F.2d at 926; 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1982) (employees or representatives who
believe physically threatening safety or health standard violation or imminent danger exists may
request Secretary to inspect violation or danger). The Donovan court, however, stated that
employees and their unions have only a limited role in the enforcement of the Act since the Act
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conclusion that the Secretary possessed the sole authority to enforce the Act.5 6
The Second Circuit reasoned that incident to the Secretary's prosecutorial au-
thority was the Secretary's unfettered discretion to settle citations without the
burden of having to entertain union objections to the substance of the settle-
ment agreement."
After examining the scheme of the Act in general, the Donovan court
focused on the specific language of Section 10(c).5 8 The Second Circuit con-
cluded that the language in section 10(c) permitting employees to initiate a
hearing to contest only the reasonableness of the period of abatement simi-
larly limits the scope of the last sentece of section 10(c) which allows em-
ployees to participate as "parties" in employer-initiated hearings." The
Donovan court determined that the last sentence in section 10(c) confers upon
employees merely the procedural right to participate in pre-hearing discovery
and to present witnesses at OSHRC hearings,60 not the substantive right to
challenge proposed methods of abatement. 6' Had Congress intended to grant
employees broad participatory rights in OSHRC proceedings, the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that Congress would not have limited the grounds upon which
does not provide the union and its employees any private right of action. 713 F.2d at 926.
Moreover, the court maintained that the Act does not permit a union to prosecute a citation once
the Secretary has withdrawn it, compel the Secretary to adopt a particular standard, nor appeal
an OSHRC decision once the Secretary decides that he will not prosecute the citatioil regardless
of the appellate court's decision. Id'. Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that the Act permits
employees to overcome the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion in only two situations. Id. First,
the Donovan court stated that employees may challenge the period of abatement specified in a
citation. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (employee or representatives who file notice with
Secretary alleging length of period of abatement specified in citation is unreasonable are entitled
to OSHRC hearing). Second, the Second Circuit stated that employees may bring a mandamus
action to compel the Secretary to enjoin an imminent danger at their workplace. 713 F.2d 926-27;
see 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1982) (employees may seek writ of mandamus if Secretary arbitrarily or
capriciously fails to seek relief of imminent danger).
56. 713 F.2d at 927.
57 See id. In determining that the Secretary possessed the sole prosecutorial authority to
enforce the Act, the Donovan court reasoned that permitting the Secretary to settle citations
without OSHRC hearings achieved the OSH Act's basic remedial purpose of bringing about the
rapid abatement of unsafe or unhealthy working conditions. Id. Since the Act stays the employ-
er's obligation to abate a hazard pending the entry of the Commission's final order, continuation
of OSHRC proceedings after an employer has withdrawn its notice of contest in order to enter-
tain employee objections to a settlement agreement delays the occurrence of abatement and pre-
vents the Secretary from taking any steps to compel abatement. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1982)
(period of time permitted to correct violation shall not begin to run until entry of Commission's
final order if employer contests citation in good faith). Additionally, the Second Circuit noted
that the possibility of further OSHRC hearings would discourage employers from negotiating set-
tlements. 713 F.2d at 927.
58. See infra note 59 and text accompanying notes 59-61 (Donovan court's interpretation
of § 10(c)).
59. See 713 F.2d at 928. The Donovan court stated that the only substantive right that §
10(c) confers upon employees in enforcement hearings is the limited right to challenge the period
of time specified in a citation for the abatement of a violation. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982)
(§ 10(c)); see also supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)).
60. 713 F.2d at 927 n.13.
61. Id. at 927-28.
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employees may challenge a citation. 62 The Donovan court concluded that by
allowing employees to make only one express objection to citations, Congress
implied an intent to prevent employees from objecting to citations on other
grounds.63 The Second Circuit found further indication in the Act's legislative
history that Congress intended to limit employee participation in all OSHRC
hearings to matteri concerning the reasonableness of the abatement period.
64
62. Id.
63. See id. at 928. In concluding that employees may not participate fully in OSHRC hear-
ings because § 10(c) does not allow them to do so expressly, the Second Circuit in Donovan
stated that as a general proposition, Congress' express allowance of one specific objection sug-
gests a congressional intent to foreclose at least some other objections. Id. The Donovan court
found that § 6(b)(6)(A) of the Act indicated that when Congress intended to grant employees the
right to a hearing to challenge an employer's abatement methods, Congress did so on the face of
the statute. Id. at 929; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A) (1982) (§ 6(b)(6)(A)). Section 6(b)(6)(A) per-
mits an employer to obtain a temporary order from the Secretary granting a variance from a
safety standard. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A) (1982). The temporary order must prescribe the
methods by which the employer plans to comply with the standard and before the Secretary will
grant the variance, employees must be given an opportunity for a hearing. Id. The Second Cir-
cuit did not explain the relationship between § 6(b)(6)(A) and § 10(c). See 713 F.2d at 929. Ap-
parently, the Donovan court concluded that because under § 6(b)(6)(A), employees may contest
the methods by which employers, in order to obtain a variance, intend to comply with the stan-
dard in question, § 10(c)'s silence concerning the scope of employee participation in employer-
initiated hearings indicates that Congress intended to limit the party status of employees under §
10(c). See id.
The Second Circuit found that a comparison between § 10(c) and § 9(a) of the OSH Act of-
fered further proof that Congress meant to limit employee participatory rights in all OSHRC
hearings. See id. at 928-29; 29 U.SC. § 658(a) (1982) (§ 9(a)). The Commission in Donovan con-
tended that because § 9(a) requires the Secretary to specify only the time for abatement in a cita-
tion and not abatement requirements or methods, the only objection an employee would have
reason to raise upon reading a citation would be that the period of abatement fixed in the citation
was unreasonably long. 713 F.2d at 928; see 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982) (citation must describe
with particularity nature of violation including reference to provision of chapter, standard, rule,
regulation of order allegedly violated, as well as fix reasonable time for abatement of violation).
The Commission reasoned that, therefore, Congress' reference to abatement dates in § 10(c) can-
not be interpreted as demonstrating a congressional intent to limit employee participatory rights
as parties to employer-initiated hearings. 713 F.2d at 928.
The Sec6nd Circuit rejected the Commission's argument, noting that § 9(a) does not re-
quire the Secretary to specify in a citation merely the abatement period, but also provides that the
citation must describe the nature of the violation and the standard or rule allegedly violated. Id.;
see 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982) (§ 9(a)). The Donovan court determined that upon reading a cita-
tion, employees could wish to contest the appropriateness of the cited standard or perhaps the ac-
curacy of the Secretary's description of the worksite violation. 713 F.2d at 928. The Second Cir-
cuit, therefore, concluded that by limiting the scope of employee contests in § 10(c), Congress
implied its intent to limit the participatory rights of employees in all OSHRC hearings. Id. Fur-
thermore, the Donovan court noted that the absence of any reference to abatement plans or
methods in either § 9(a) or § 10(c) reinforced the conclusion that Congress did not intend to per-
mit employees to litigate these matters before the Commission. Id. at 929; see 29 U.S.C. § 658(a)
(1982) (§ 9(a)); id. § 659(c) (§ 10(c)).
64. See 713 F.2d at 929 (court discussing legislative history of § 10(c)); S. REP. No. 1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. - , reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191
(legislative history of § 10(c)). But see infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text (legislative
history supports broad view of employee participatory rights).,
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The Donovan court cited a paragraph in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee Report in which the Committee stated that section 10(c) gives em-
ployees or their representatives the right to challenge a citation on the ground
that the period of time provided in the citation for the abatement of a viola-
tion is unreasonably long.65 The Second Circuit read this paragraph to mean
that employees may challenge a citation only on grounds relating to the rea-
sonableness of the period of abatement in both employer and employee-init-
iated hearings."
The Donovan court concluded its review of section 10(c) and its legis-
lative history by noting that the union's interpretation of section 10(c) pro-
duced an anomalous result."7 The Second Circuit stated that under the
union's interpretation, employees would enjoy greater participatory rights in
employer-initiated hearings than in hearings the employees themselves in-
itiated.68 The Donovan court found that the legislative plan of the Act pro-
vided no justification for such an anomaly and accordingly, held that unions
possessed no standing to contest the substantive merits of a settlement agree-
ment. 6
9
65. 713 F.2d at 929; supra S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191 (section 10(c) gives employees right to challenge cita-
tion on ground that period of abatement fixed in citation is unreasonably long).
66. See 713 F.2d at 919 (Donovan court stated that legislative history of § 10(c) suggests
Congress intended to limit rights of employees in enforcement of Act). The Second Circuit main-
tained that in addition to the Act's legislative history, a House-Senate compromise concerning §
10(c) also indicated congressional intent to restrict employee participation in OSHRC hearings.
Id. at 929 n.16; see CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5235 (congressional discussion of House-Senate compromise
concerning § 10(c)). But see infra note 133 (House-Senate compromise supports broad view of
employee participatory rights under § 10(c)). The Donovan court noted that the House version of
§ 10(c) contained no provision for employee challenges in OSHRC enforcement proceedings. 713
F.2d 929 n.16, see CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. __, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5235 (House amendment to S.2193 did not provide for employee
challenges to citations). The Second Circuit stated that the House withdrew its amendment in
favor of the Senate version of § 10(c), which permitted employees to challenge the reasonableness
of the period for abatement of a hazard, in exchange for Senate acquiescence to an amendment
giving employers the right to a rehearing if an employer were unable to abate the hazard within
the abatement period specified in a citation. 713 F.2d at 929 n.16; see CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5235 (House with-
drew amendment to § 10(c) in favor of Senate bill). The nature of the House-Senate compromise,
determined the Second Circuit, indicated that Congress intended to limit the participatory rights
of employees in all Commission enforcement hearings. 713 F.2d at 929 n.16.
67. 713 F.2d at 919.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 929-30. The Donovan court determined that the union's interpretation of § 10(c)
would produce a result Congress did not likely intend. Id. at 929 n.17. The Second Circuit
reasoned that if unions possessed the right to object to all the terms of a citation or proposed set-
tlement, unions would enjoy unwarranted bargaining leverage against management. Id. The
Donovan court speculated that unions would use OSHA regulations and citations as bargaining
chips to obtain work concessions from employers in OSH Act litigation otherwise unattainable at
collective bargaining sessions. See id. All evidence of congressional intent, found the Second Cir-




The Fifth Circuit in Donovan v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
(OCA W)70 reviewed the Donovan holding and rejected the Second Circuit's
interpretation of section 10(c). 7' In OCA W, OSHA inspected an American
Petrofina Company plant and found several safety violations.72 As a result of
the inspection, the Secretary issued to the employer four citations alleging
that American Petrofina seriously violated section 5(a)(1) of the Act by re-
moving asbestos insulation in an unsafe manner. 73 The Secretary also pro-
posed penalties against the employer. 74 American Petrofina responded by fil-
ing notices of contest to the four citations.7 1 OSHRC consolidated the cita-
tions into two cases, assigning an adminstrative law judge to adjudicate each
of the hearings. 76 The union elected party status to each of the two hearings.
77
Before either hearing began, however, the Secretary and American Petrofina
agreed to a settlement in which the Secretary reduced the citations from
''serious" to "non-serious" in exchange for the employer's agreement to
withdraw its notices of contest.78 Although the union participated in the set-
tlement negotiations, the union refused to join the agreement, objecting to the
reclassification of the violations.7 9 Both administrative law judges subse-
quently approved the settlement agreements over the union's objections to the
reclassification of the violations and to the employer's alleged failure to take
appropriate corrective measures when removing the asbestos. 80 The union
petitioned the Commission to review the administrative laxv judges' rulings. 81
OSHRC granted the union's petition, provoking the Secretary to file with
OSHRC a motion to vacate the review order.8" The Commission denied the
Secretary's motion and the Secretary appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
3
70. 718 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1983).
71. See id. at 1348-51 (Fifth Circuit held employees in employer-initiated hearings may
litigate fully merits of citation).
72. Id. at 1343.
73. Id. In Donovan v. OCA W the Secretary issued to American Petrofina four citations
alleging failure to clear debris, protect employees against falls, guard an abrasive disk, store oxy-
gen cylinders properly, guard open-sided platforms, and use of defective welding cable. Id. at
n.5. The citations also alleged that the employer endangered employees by hoisting materials over
their heads, failing to guard electrical equipment, and using defective ladders. Id. In two
asbestos-related citations, the Secretary alleged that the employer seriously violated an asbestos
standard by failing to monitor employees who were removing asbestos insulation or working in
areas where asbestos was being removed, as well as by failing to collect representative samples of
asbestos, failing to label asbestos-containing materials, and failing to dispose of asbestos waste.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982) (employers must furnish employees a safe workplace).











WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1411
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Commission's denial of the Sec-
retary's motion to vacate the review order, 84 holding that employees have no
standing to contest settlement agreements on grounds other than the reason-
ableness of the abatement period.85 The OCA W court, however, determined
that section 10(c) entitles employees to plenary participation as parties to em-
ployer-initiated hearings until the employer withdraws his notice of contest."
The Fifth Circuit in OCA W reviewed the conflicting circuit court cases and
adopted the minority view that section 10(c) does not restrict employees in
employer-initiated hearings to contesting merely the reasonableness of the
abatement period.87 The OCA W court reasoned that Congress intended the
term "parties" in the last sentence of section 10(c) to mean what "parties"
84. Id. at 1353.
85. Id. at 1352-53. The Fifth Circuit in Donovan v. OCA W stated that because employees
are full parties to employer-initiated OSHRC hearings, employees ought to have the ability to
contest settlement agreements between the Secretary and employers, for settlement agreements
affect employee interests in occupational safety just as significantly as do litigated citations. Id.
at 1352. In the interest of administrative uniformity, however, the OCA W court refused to inter-
pret § 10(c) as entitling employees to contest settlements on grounds other than the reasonableness
of the abatement period. See id. at 1352-53. The Fifth Circuit noted that the circuits unanimously
follow the Secretary's view that employees may object only to the reasonableness of abatement
periods specified in settlement agreements. Id. The OCA W court, therefore, did not wish to
create administrative confusion by striking out on its own on this issue. See id.; supra notes 30-37
and accompanying text (circuits unanimously agree with Secretary's position that unions may
only contest reasonableness of abatement periods in settlements).
86. 718 F.2d at 1353.
87. See id. at 1348-49. The OCA W court adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's
holding in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n
(OCA W v. OSHRC) that § 10(c) permits employees as parties to employer-initiated hearings to
litigate all matters relating to the citation in question. Id.; see OCAW v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643,
648 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Commission has jurisdiction in employer-initiated hearings to entertain
employees' objections on all matters relating to citation), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982).
In OCA W v. OSHRC, the Commission dismissed a citation the Secretary has issued to an
employer. 671 F.2d at 645. The union, which had elected party status in the employer-initated
hearing, petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit to review OSHRC's dismissal of the citation.
Id. The Secretary took no part in'the appeal. Id. at 646. The employer moved to intervene, argu-
ing that unions have no standing to appeal OSHRC decisions. Id. at 645-47.
The District of Columbia Circuit sustained the union's petition for review and denied the
company's motion to dismiss, holding that a union indeed has the right to appeal an OSHRC
decision when the union has participated as a party in the Commission hearing. Id. at 645. The
District of Columbia Circuit determined that, contrary to the employer's contention, § 10(c) does
not limit the employees' right to participate in employer-initiated OSHRC hearing or to appeal
OSHRC decisions to matters concerning the reasonableness of the abatement period. Id. at
646-47; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(e) (1982) (§ 10(c)); id. § 660 (any person aggrieved by OSHRC order
may seek judicial review). The OCA W v. OSHRC court found that § 10(c) provides for two
kinds of hearings in which employees enjoy different degrees of participation. See 671 F.2d at
647. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that only in employee-initiated hearings are employ-
ees limited to contesting the reasonableness of the abatement period. Id. The court stated that the
abatement period language in § 10(c) refers only to the grounds upon which employees may in-
itiate a hearing, not to the employees' participation as parties to employer-initiated hearings ad-
dressed in the last sentence of § 10(c). See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (§ 10(c)); supra note 7
(text of § 10(c)).
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ordinarily means, persons entitled to participate fully in litigation."8 Section
10(c), stated the Fifth Circuit, creates a two-tiered enforcement scheme con-
sisting of employee and employer-initiated hearings.89 Although section 10(c)
permits employees to initiate a hearing solely to challenge the reasonableness
of the abatement period, the OCA W court noted that section 10(c) contains
no language that limits similarly employee participation in employer-initiated
hearings.90 The Fifth Circuit found that its view of the Act's general pur-
poses, as well as all evidence of congressional intent, supported the court's in-
terpretation of section 10(c). 91
The OCA W court conceded that the Act vests the Labor Secretary with
exclusive prosecutorial authority, but noted that employee participatory rights
arise at the adjudicatory stage of the process, which the Commission and not
the Secretary controls. 9 The Fifth Circuit declared that Congress sought to
enact a comprehensive statutory structure that would provide workers, the
persons most concerned with occupational safety, with meaningful participa-
tion in the effort to reduce workplace injury and disease. 93 Accordingly, the
OCA W court found that Congress limited labor's role in the investigatory
and citation stages but provided unions with plenary participation at the ad-
judicatory stage. 9 The Fifth Circuit explained that extensive employee par-
ticipation at the investigatory and citation stages is inappropriate because the
identification of safety violations is peculiarly within the Secretary's
expertise. 9" The OCA W court, however, stated, that once the Secretary has
determined that the employer has violated a standard, deference to the Sec-
retary's expertise becomes less compelling. 96
The OCA W court acknowledged that its interpretation of section 10(c)
produced the anomalous result of according employees greater participatory
rights in employer-initiated hearings than in hearings the employees
themselves initiated. 97 The Fifth Circuit, however, found this result entirely
rational. 9s Unless an employer chooses to litigate a citation, reasoned the
OCA W court, the Act restricts employees to challenging the only aspect of
88. 718 F.2d at 1349.
89. Id. at 1347; see also supra note 87 (District of Columbia Circuit in OCA W v. OSHRC
finds § 10(c) creates two types of hearings).
90. 718 F.2d at 1349; see 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (§ 10(c)); see also supra note 7 (text of
§ 10(c)); supra note 87 (District of Columbia Circuit in OCA W v. OSHRC finds § 10(c) does not
limit employee participation in employer-initiated hearings).
91. Cf. 718 F.2d at 1349 (OCA W court found Act's general purpose and legislative history
of Act outweigh maxim that Congress' express allowance of one specific objection suggests





96. Id. at 1349-50.
97. Id. at 1350.
98. Id.
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immediate concern to employees, the period of time within which the em-
ployer must correct the hazard.9 9 The Fifth Circuit noted that if, however, an
employer chooses to dispute a citation, the Act ensures that employees will
enjoy an equal voice in the proceedings in order to meet the employer's at-
tempts to revoke or modify the citation.10
The OCA W court found that the same legislative history that the Second
Circuit in Donovan interpreted as supporting its holding that section 10(c)
limits employee participation 0 1 actually suggested that Congress intended to
give employees broad participatory rights in employer-initiated hearings.0'
The Fifth Circuit cited two paragraphs in the Senate Labor Committee report
concerning section 10(c).'13 The first, which deals with employer-initiated
hearings, states that employees and their representatives may "participate as
parties."'0 4 The second paragraph provides that employees may initiate a
hearing on the ground that the period of abatement specified in a citation is
unreasonably long.'0 5 The OCA W court interpreted these two paragraphs to
imply that Congress intended to create two types of hearings, one employer-
initiated and the other initiated by employees. 6 The Fifth Circuit determined
that Congress meant to limit employee rights only in employee-initiated hear-
ings, because only the paragraph in the legislative history that addresses em-
ployee-initiated hearings contains language limiting employee contests to the
reasonableness of the abatement period.
0 7
The OCA W court found additional support for its interpretation of sec-
tion 10(c) in section 12(g) of the Act.0 8 Section 10(c) states that OSHRC will
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (Second Circuit's finding in Donovan
that legislative history indicates § 10(c) limits employee participation in all OSHRC hearings to
matters concerning reasonableness of abatement period).
102. 718 F.2d at 1349.
103. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 1281, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191). The OCA W court adopted the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's finding in OCA W v. OSHRC that the OSH Act's legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to limit employee participatory rights only in employee-initiated hearings, Id.; see
OCAW v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court contends that legislative history in-
dicates Congress did not intend to limit union participation in employer-initiated hearings to
matters concerning length of abatement period), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982).
104. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5177, 5191 (employees or employee representative may "particiate as parties" in
employer-initiated hearings).
105. See id. (section 10(c) gives employees right to initiate hearing on ground that period of
abatement specified in citation is unreasonably long).
106. 718 F.2d at 1349.
107. Cf. id. at 1348-49 (OCA W court adopts District of Columbia Circuit's finding in
OCA W v. OSHRC that OSH Act's legislative history suggests Congress intended to permit em-
ployees to participate fully in employer-initiated hearings); see supra note 103 (discussing OCA W
v. OSHRC court's interpretation of OSH Act's legislative history); see also infra notes 120-29
and accompanying text (OSH Act's legislative history indicates Congress intended to limit em-
ployee participatory rights only in employee-initiated hearings).
108. See 718 F.2d at 1350-51 (discussing § 12(g) of Act); 29 U.S.C. § 661(0 (1976) (§ 12(g));
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conduct hearings in accordance with the rules of procedure OSHRC has pre-
scribed.'0 9 Section 12(g) provides that in the event the Commission has
adopted no contrary rules of procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will apply in OSHRC hearings." 0 The Fifth Circuit determined that because
the Commission has adopted no rules specifically governing the extent of
employee participation as parties to employer-initiated hearings, section 12(g)
directs courts to look to the Federal Rules."I' The OCA W court reasoned that
employee election of party status is a process analagous to intervention as of
right, thus the applicable Federal Rule of Procedure is rule 24(a), which
governs intervention." 2 The Fifth Circuit noted that under rule 24(a), an
intervenor as of right possesses standing equal to that of the original
parties.' '3 Therefore, determined the Fifth Circuit, employees who have
elected party status in employer-initiated hearings may, like intervenors, par-
ticipate fully in the litigation.'
4
Both the Second and Fifth Circuits found that Congress sought to strike a
balance between the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion and the right of em-
ployees to participate in the adjudication of an act that Congress designed pri-
marily to protect employee safety." 5 The two circuits, however, disagreed on
where Congress intended to strike that balance." 6 The Donovan court de-
termined that in deference to the Secretary's exclusive prosecutorial authority,
Congress created an enforcement scheme in which employees and their unions
enjoy the same limited participatory rights in all OSHRC hearings, regardless
of which party initiates the hearing.' Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit in
OCA W found that Congress enacted a two-tiered adjudicatory structure in
infra text accompanying notes 111-14 (Fifth Circuit's discussion of § 12(g)).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 661(0 (1982); see 29 C.F.R. § 2200.2 (1983) (in absence of specific provi-
sion, OSHRC procedure shall be in accord with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
111. 718 F.2d at 1350. But see Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,026 n. 19
(No. 4386, 1982) (Commission found Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable to considera-
tion of § 10(c) because Department of Labor Rules 20 and 21 exist) rev'd sub. nom Donovan v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983); see 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.20 (1983) (employees may elect party status in employer-initiated hearings); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.21 (1983) (nonparties may intervene in enforcement proceedings at Commission's discre-
tion).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.21 (1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (anyone may intervene in action
either under statute or to protect interest relating to subject of action).
113. See 718 F.2d at 1350 (citing C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 1920, at 611 (1972)) (courts treat intervenor as of right as if intervenor were original par-
ty with standing equal to that of original parties).
115. Compare Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d at 927
(Second Circuit found that legislative scheme of Act suggests no congressional intent to subordi-
nate Secretary's prosecutorial discretion in reaching settlement agreements to right of employees)
with Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d at 1349-50 (Fifth Circuit found that
Congress vested prosecutional authority in Secretary but allowed for meaningful employee par-
ticipation in adjudicatory stage of Act).
116. See supra note 115 (comparing Second and Fifth Circuit views on balance Act strikes
between Secretary's prosecutorial discretion and rights of employees).
117. See Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d at 925-26
1984] 1429
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1411
which the scope of rights that employees enjoy differs depending on whether
the employees or their employer initiate the contest." '8
Although the Second and Fifth Circuits each determined that the OSH
Act's legislative history supported their conflicting interpretations of section
10(c), 119 the legislative history in fact does not support conclusively either cir-
cuit's position. 2 The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee report
contains two relevant paragraphs.2 ' The first provides that employees or
their representatives have the right to "participate as parties" to employer-
initiated hearings. 2 2 The second states that employees or their representatives
also may initiate a hearing on the ground that the period of abatement
specified in the citation is unreasonably long. 23 The committee report does
not reveal whether the language in the latter paragraph restricting employee-
initiated contests to the reasonableness of the period of abatement contained
in a citation similarly limits the employee rights to participate as parties
described in the former paragraph.' 2 Thus, the question the legislative
history raises is the same as that inherent in the structure of section 10(c) it-
self.'25 Whether examining section 10(c) or its legislative history, courts must
determine what effect limiting employee rights to initiate contests has on the
right of employees to participate as parties to employer-initiated hearings.
26
(union incorrect that § 10(c) grants employees greater participatory rights at employer-initiated
hearings then at employee-initiated hearings); see also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text
(Second Circuit in Donovan found Act limits employee participation in all OSHRC hearings to
matters concerning abatement period).
118. See Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d at 1349-51 (OSH Act limits
employee objections to reasonableness of abatement period only in employee- initiated hearings);
see also supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text (Fifth Circuit in OCA W found OSH Act
grants employees full participation in employer-initiated hearings).
119. Compare Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d at 929
(Second Circuit found that legislative history indicates Congress intended to limit employee par-
ticipatory rights in all OSHRC hearings) with Donovan v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 718
F.2d at 1349 (Fifth Circuit found that legislative history suggests Congress intended to limit
employee participatory rights only in employee-initiated hearings).
120. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing OSH Act's legislative
history).
121. See S. REP. No. 1281, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. - , reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5177, 5191. The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (the
Committee) on Senate bill S.2193 contains two relevant paragraphs. See id. The first states as
follows: "if the employer decides to contest 'a citation ... the Secretary must afford an opportu-
nity for formal hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act ... [and] must make provision
for affected employees or their representatives to participate as parties." Id. The second para-
graph begins as follows: "Section 10(c) also gives an employee or representative of employees a
right, whenever he believes that the period of time provided in a citation for abatement of a vio-




125. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982) (§ 10(c)); supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text
(section 10(c) does not reveal whether language limiting employee contests to reasonableness of
abatement period similarly limits employee participation as parties to employer-initiated
contests).
126. Cf. supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (language of § 10(c) is ambiguous con-
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Although congressional intent regarding employee participatory rights is
unclear, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation -of the legislative history of section
10(c) is more plausible and certainly more complete than the Second Circuit's
reading of the committee report.127 The Fifth Circuit in OCA W cited both
relevant paragraphs of the legislative history and correctly determined that
only the latter, which refers to employee-initiated hearings, contains language
limiting employee participatory rights.'"" The fact that Congress addressed
employee rights to "participate as parties" in a second paragraph of the legis-
lative history containing no qualifying language suggests that Congress meant
not to restrict the right of employees and their unions to take part in em-
ployer-initiated hearings. 12 9
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in OCA W, the Donovan court examined only the
paragraph of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee report that ad-
dresses employee-initiated hearings.' 3 The Second Circuit disregarded com-
pletely the paragraph in the legistive history that provides that employees may
cerning scope of employee participation as "parties" to employer-initiated hearings); supra notes
121-24 and accompanying text (two relevant paragraphs of legislative history unclear concerning
scope of employees' right to "participate as parties" addressed in former paragraph).
127. Compare Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d at 929
(Second Circuit in Donovan found second paragraph in legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to limit employee participation in all OSHRC hearings) with Donovan v. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers, 718 F.2d at 1349 (Fifth Circuit in OCA W found two paragraphs of legislative
history suggest Congress intended to limit employee participation only in employee-initiated
hearings); see infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (comparing Fifth and Second Circuit's
interpretation of legislative history of § 10(c)).
128. See 718 F.2d at 1349 (Fifth Circuit citing S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,..
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5191). The Fifth Circuit in OCA W found
that the two relevant paragraphs of the Act's legislative history indicated that Congress con-
templated two different applications of the "parties" provision in § 10(c). Id.; see supra note 121
(First paragraph of legislative history does not qualify employee right to participate as parties to
employer-initiated hearings).
129. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (similarity of treatment of employee par-
ticipatory rights in § 10(c), § 10(c)'s legislative history, and rules promulgated under § 10(c) indi-
cates Congress intended to permit employees full participation in employer-initiated hearings).
130. See 713 F.2d at 929. In Donovan, the Second Circuit cited only that portion of the leg-
islative history that addresses employee-initiated hearings and limits employee contests to the rea-
sonableness of the abatement period specified in a citation. See id. The Donovan court assumed
that that portion of the legislative history explains the substantive rights the Act grants to em-
ployees in all OSHRC enforcement hearings, including those an employer initiates. See id. The
incompleteness of the Second Circuit's treatment of the legislative history of § 10(c) is evident in
the first sentence of the paragraph the Donovan court cites, which states that § 10(c) "also" gives
employees the right to challenge a citation on the ground that the specified period of abatement is
unreasonably long. See id. The "also" in the first sentence refers to the preceeding paragraph in
the Senate Labor committee report which addresses the right of employees to "participate as par-
ties" to employer-initiated hearings. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5191; see also 718 F.2d at 1349 (OCA Wcourt citing
full text of relevant legislative history); OCAW v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citing two paragraphs of legislative history), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982); supra note 121
(text of legislative history).
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participate as parties to employer-initiated contests.' 31 The Donovan court in-
ferred from the portion of the legislative history that permits employees to in-
itiate a hearing to challenge only the reasonableness of the period of abate-
ment that Congress intended to similarly limit the participatory rights of em-
ployees in all OSHRC hearings.' 32 The Donovan court, therefore, failed to
address the crucial question of what effect the limiting language in the
paragraph in the Senate Committee report concerning employee-initiated
hearings has on the employees' right to "participate as parties" conferred in
the paragraph addressing employer-initiated hearings. 133
131. See 713 F.2d at 929.
132. See id. In reference to the language of § 10(c), the Donovan court stated that if Con-
gress had intended to give employees broader rights in OSHRC enforcement proceedings, Con-
gress would not have limited the grounds upon which employees may challenge a citation. Id. at
928-29. This assumption fails entirely to address the possibility that Congress intended to grant
employees greater rights in employer-initiated hearings than in hearings the employees initiate.
See id. The OSH Act creates two types of hearings in which employees may or may not enjoy dif-
ferent degrees of participation. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (section 10(c) does
not define scope of employee participation in employer-initiated hearings). The limitations Con-
gress imposed on employee rights to initiate a hearing may be relevant, but certainly are not
dispositive to a determination of what substantive rights Congress intended for employees in
employer-initiated hearings. See id.
133. See 713 F.2d at 929. The Donovan court found that, in addition to the Act's legislative
history, a House-Senate compromise concerning § 10(c) indicated that Congress intended to af-
ford employees limited participatory rights in all OSHRC hearings. Id. at 929 n.16; see CONF.
REP No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177,
5235 (congressional discussion of House-Senate compromise concerning § 10(c)); see also supra
note 66 (Donovan court's finding that House-Senate compromise suggests Congress intended to
limit employee role in enforcement of Act). The implications of the compromise, however, are
unclear. See CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. - , reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG.; & AD. NEws 5177, 5235. The Conference Report states that the Senate bill provided that
employees had "the right to appeal" the period of abatement and the "opportunity to par-
ticipate as parties" in OSHRC hearings. Id. The House version, on the other hand, granted the
"right of appeal" only to employers and the Secretary. Id. The Conference Report makes no
reference to any treatment in the House bill of employee rights to participate as parties. See id.
The Conference Report does not mention whether the House version of the bill limited employee
rights to participate as parties in employer-initiated hearings and thus does not reveal whether the
House and Senate differed on this point. See id. The Conference Report states only that the
House withdrew its amendment that denied employees the "right to appeal." Id. The Conference
Report, however, refers to both the employees' "right to appeal" and "opportunity to partici-
pate as parties," not to employee "challenges" in enforcement proceedings, as the Second Cir-
cuit paraphrases the compromise. Compare CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. I,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5235 (Conference Report of House-
Senate compromise) with 713 F.2d at 929 n.16 (Second Circuit's version of Conference Report of
House-Senate Compromise). Additionally, the Second Circuit failed to cite the language in the
Senate bill addressing employee rights to "participate as parties". See 713 F.2d at 929 n.16. By
stating that the House and Senate compromised on a bill that allowed employees to "challenge"
the reasonableness of the period of abatement without distinguishing the language in the Senate
bill permitting employees to participate as parties, the Second Circuit implied that the House and
Senate agreed to limit employee participation in employer-initiated as well as employee-initiated
hearings to matters concerning the length of the abatement period. See id. Nothing in the Con-
ference Report supports this assumption. See CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5235.
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The Department of Labor rules promulgated under the OSH Act provide
further evidence that employees enjoy the right to participate fully in em-
ployer-initiated hearings under section 10(c).' 34 The interim rules established
under section 10(c) provided that in all proceedings brought pursuant to sec-
tion 10(c), the Secretary, the cited employer and the affected employees or
their unions "shall be deemed parties.""'3 The interim rules did not disting-
uish between the party rights employees enjoyed and those the Secretary and
employers possessed. 3 6 The Department of Labor codified in the permanent
rule concerning employee election of party status the apparently equal status
the interim rules afforded employees and employers. 3 The permanent rule
permits employees to elect party status in employer-initiated hearings and
similarly grants employers party status in hearings the employees initiate.'38
The permanent rule qualifies neither the employer's nor the employees' party
status, thus suggesting that Congress intended to accord employees unlimited
participation in employer-initiated hearings.' 3
When examined together, a pattern may be seen in the manner in which
Congress in section 10(c) and its legislative history and the Department of
Labor in the rules promulgated under section 10(c) treat employer and em-
ployee-initiated hearings.' 0 Section 10(c), its legislative history, and the rules
enacted under section 10(c) each address employer and employee-initiated
hearings separately and each states, without express qualification, that em-
ployees or their unions enjoy the right to "participate as parties" in em-
ployer-initiated hearings.'"' In each legislative and administrative discussion
134. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (interim and permanent rules pro-
mulgated under § 10(c) grant employers and employees equal status).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.5(a) (1971).
136. See id.
137. See id. § 2200.20(a) (1983) (affected employees may participate as parties to employer-
initiated hearings); id. § 2200.20(b) (employers may elect party status in employee-initiated hear-
ings).
138. Id. § 2200.20(a), (b).
139. See id.; Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,026 (No. 4386, 1982) (in-
terim and permanent rules afford both employees and employers equal party status in OSHRC
hearings), rev'd sub. nom Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d
918 (2d Cir. 1983).
140. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing similarity between § 10(c),
legislative history, and rules promulgated under § 10(c)).
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982); S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191; 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20(a), (b) (1983). The
various statutory references to § 10(c) each treat employee participatory rights in a similar
fashion. The first sentence of § 10(c) states that employees may initiate a hearing to contest the
reasonableness of the period of abatement specified in a citation. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982). The
last sentence of § 10(c) provides without qualification that employees may "participate as
parties" to employer-initiated hearings. Id., see supra note 7 (text of § 10(c)). Similarly, one
paragraph in the legislative history of § 10(c) states without qualification that employees may
"participate as parties" to employer-initiated hearings, while the next provides that § 10(c)
"also" allows unions to initiate a hearing on the ground that the period of abatement fixed in a
citation is unreasonably long. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5191; see supra note 121 (text of legislative history); supra
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of OSHRC hearings, only the language which addresses employee-initiated
hearings expressly limits employee participation to matters concerning the
reasonableness of the abatement period.'42 While the Second Circuit in
Donovan reasoned that Congress' allowance to employees of one express ob-
jection suggested a congressional intent to foreclose other objections,'"3 the
more persuasive conclusion seems to be to the contrary."' Had Congress in-
tended to qualify employee participatory rights in employer-initiated hear-
ings, Congress and the Department of Labor would not likely have treated
employee and employer-initiated hearings separately in each statutory refer-
ence to employee participatory rights, nor failed to qualify in any text the
legally signficant term "parties."' '45
In the face of Congress and the Department of Labor's unqualified treat-
ment of employees' rights to participate in employer-initiated hearings, the
Donovan court nevertheless determined that the Secretary's prosecutorial dis-
cretion precludes union input in OSHRC hearings on matters beyond the
reasonableness of the abatement period.'4 6 Although Congress indeed con-
ferred upon the Secretary the exclusive authority to prosecute the OSH Act,"'
the Second Circuit's position overlooks the distinction between the enforce-
ment and adjudicatory stages of the Act.' 48 The Secretary enjoys the unfet-
tered prosecutorial discretion to initiate enforcement proceedings by issuing a
citation to an employer after investigating a workplace safety hazard. 14 9 Once
the employer initiates a hearing to contest the citation, however, the Act
enters its adjudicatory phase and the Secretary's exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in issuing the citation is placed at issue before the Commission.' ° In
text accompanying notes 121-26 (two relevant paragraphs in legislative history treat employee
rights in employer and employee-initiated hearings differently). Like § 10(c) and its legislative
history, the rules promulgated under § 10(c) also distinguish the rights employees enjoy in
employer-initiated hearings and the grounds upon which employees may themselves initiate a
hearing. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20(a), (b) (1983). Subsection (a) of § 2200.20 states, again without
qualification, that affected employees may elect to "participate as parties" in employer-initiated
hearings. Id. § 2200.20(a). Subsection (b) provides that employees may file a notice of contest to
challenge the reasonableness of the period for abatement of a violation. Id. § 2200.20(b).
142. See supra note 141 (comparing § 10(c), legislative history of § 10(c), and rules promul-
gated under § 10(c)).
143. Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d at 928.
144. See United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (courts ordinarily
should apply qualifying words in the statutes to words or phrases immediately preceeding and
not to more remote words or phrases).
145. See id.
146. Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d at 929.
147. See supra note 27 (Mobil Oil Commission conceded Secretary has exclusive authority
to prosecute OSH Act).
148. Cf. id. (Mobil Oil Commission argued that Secretary's insistence that his prosecutorial
discretion limits employees' participatory rights of OSHRC hearings ignores distinction between
enforcement and adjudicatory stages of Act).
149. See id. (Mobil Oil Commission asserted Secretary possesses exclusive prosecutorial
authority only in enforcement stage of Act).
150. See id. (Mobil Oil Commission stated Act enters adjudicatory stage when employer ini-
tiates hearing to contest citation); Donovan v. OCAW, 718 F.2d at 1349 (union's rights arise in
Act's adjudicatory stage which is within OSHRC's control).
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order to determine whether or not to enforce the Secretary's citation, the
Commission must adjudicate the various interests of the parties before it.'
Had the Act provided only for traditional two party litigation, the contesting
employer and the Secretary would constitue the only principal parties because
of their adverse interests.'5 2 By allowing employees or their unions to inter-
vene and "participate as parties" in the proceedings as well, Congress recog-
nized that OSH Act litigation often involves three parties, each with interests
potentially adverse to those of the other two.' 3 Thus, in view of section
10(c)'s unqualified provision that employees may participate as parties in em-
ployer-initiated hearings, the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion merely to in-
itiate enforcement proceedings can not alone be interpreted to restrict the em-
ployees' status as intervening parties.'5 4
A comparison between the status of employees under section 10(c) of the
OSH Act and that of charging parties under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)"' further suggests that Congress did not intend to qualify the right
of employees to intervene in employer-initiated hearings.'5 6 Charging parties
under the NLRA are employees who file with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) unfair labor practice charges against an employer.' 57 As a re-
sult of the employees' unfair labor practice petition, the NLRB may issue a
complaint against the employer which the employer may contest in
litigation.' Although the NLRA does not provide so expressly, the NLRB
rules allow charging parties to participate as full parties in such proceed-
ings. ' 9 Employees who bring a safety hazard to the Secretary's attention and
then elect party status in employer-initiate hearings under section 10(c) of the
151. See id. (Mobil Oil Commission argued OSHRC is responsible for adjudicating various
adverse interests of parties independent of Secretary's enforcement authority).
152. See Mobil Oil Corp., 1982 OSHD (CCH) 26,187, at 33,024 n.13 (No. 4386, 1982)
(OSHRC stated that in context of traditional two party litigation employer and Secretary would
be principal parties), rev'd sub. nom., Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983).
153. See id. (Commission stated that litigation before OSHRC often involves 3 parties each
with interests adverse to others).
154. See supra note 27 (Mobil Oil Commission stated that mere existence of Secretary's en-
forcement discretion does not limit statutory status of intervening employees).
155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
156. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (comparing rights of employees under
OSH Act and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1983) (term "party" includes any person filing a charge or peti-
tion under NLRA); International Union v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219 (1965) ("charging party"
is employee who files unfair labor practice charge against employer).
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). Section 160(b) of the NLRA provides that whenever an
individual charges that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice, the NLRB may serve
upon that person a complaint stating the allegations and containing a notice of hearing before
the NLRB. Id. The person against whom the complaint is served has the right to file an answer to
the complaint and appear at the hearing. Id.
159. Cf. id. Section 160(b) states that the NLRB has the discretion to permit "any other per-
son" to intervene in an unfair labor practice hearing and to present testimony, without specifying
the extent to which such other person "may participate in the hearing on the grounds upon which
such person may present testimony. See id. The rules promulgated under the NLRA, however,
provide that charging parties may participate in NLRB hearings as parties, may call witnesses
and cross-examine others, may file exceptions to any order of the trial examiner, and may file a
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OSH Act are therefore analagous to charging parties under the NLRA.'" °
Given the fact that the employee interests at stake under the OSH Act are at
least as compelling as the interests the NLRA protects, 6" Congress likely did
not intend a lesser role for employees under the OSH Act when Congress pro-
vided expressly in the statute that employees possess the right to "participate
as parties" to employer-initiated hearings.' 
6 2
The Second Circuit's holding in Donovan that employees enjoy only a
limited role in employer-initiated OSHRC hearings not only contradicts all in-
dications of congressional intent,16 3  but also produces a significant
anomaly.'6 4 Ordinarily, an employer contests a citation because the employer
petition for reconsideration of a NLRB order. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (1983); see id § 102.8 ("party"
includes any individual filing a charge in petition); International Union v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205,
219 (1965) (NLRB rules accord charging party formal recognition to participate as party to
NLRB hearing with rights of full party).
160. See supra note 55; notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing employee par-
ticipatory rights under OSH Act and NLRA respectively). The dissent in Sun Petroleum stated
that although the role of intervening employees under the OSH Act and that of charging parties
under the NLRA appear to be similar, OSH Act and NLRA procedures are not strictly
analagous. See Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products, 662 F.2d at 1191 n.5 (Pollak, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The Sun Petroleum dissent noted that, unlike the OSH Act, the
NLRA does not expressly provide that charging parties may participate as parties to NLRB pro-
ceedings. Id. Additionally, the Sun Petroleum dissent stated that the NLRA does not provide
charging parties with the elaborate protections afforded employees under the OSH Act. Id. Even
more significant, determined the Sun Petroleum dissent, was the fact that unlike the Secretary
under. the OSH Act, the NLRB under the NLRA has the statutory discretion not to issue a com-
plaint to an employer even if the NLRB finds that the employer has in fact violated the NLRA.
Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982) (Secretary "shall" issue citation to employer if Secretary
believes that employer has violated OSH Act safety standard) with 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982)
(NLRB "shall have power" to serve complaint upon employer and discretion to amend such
complaint prior to issuance of order). The Sun Petroleum dissent maintained that while each of
the distinctions between the OSH Act and the NLRA suggested that employees enjoy greater
rights under the OSH Act than under the NLRA, NLRB rules provide that charging parties may
participate fully in unfair labor practice hearings. See 622 F.2d at 1191 n.5 (Pollak, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing International Union v. Scofield for proposition that
charging parties under NLRA may intervene in NLRB hearings and participate fully). The Sun
Petroleum dissent, therefore, found it improbable that Congress could have intended a lesser role
for employees under the OSH Act than under the NLRA by providing expressly in § 10(c) of the
OSH Act that employees could "participate as parties". Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1982)
(employees may "participate as parties" in employer-initiated OSHRC hearings).
161. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (purpose of OSH Act is to provide employees with
safe and healthful workplace) with 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982 (purpose of NLRA is to ensure free
flow of commerce by encouraging practice of collective bargaining and by protecting employee
freedom of association and self-organization). Arguably, protecting employee safety and well
being is an interest at least as compelling as safeguarding interstate comierce, if not more so.
162. Cf. supra note 160 (Sun Petroleum dissent's finding that Congress probably did not in-
tend lesser role for employees under OSH Act than under NLRA).
163. See supra notes 134-62 and accompanying text (evidence of legislative intent indicates
Congress did not intend to limit employee participation in employer-initiated hearings to matters
concerning abatement period).
164. See infra text accompanying text notes 165-68 (discussing anomaly inherent in Second
Circuit's interpretation of § 10(c)).
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disputes the Secretary's finding that a safety violation exists on his prem-
ises.' The Secretary's finding often flows from an employee complaint
which the Act encourages employees to initiate and requires the Secretary to
investigate. 66 It would certainly be peculiar if section 10(c) precluded em-
ployees from pursuing at the Act's adjudicative phase, where the employees'
interests are ultimately determined, the interests the OSH Act encourages em-
ployees to monitor at the investigative phase of the Act. 67 Although section
10(c) is ambigious concerning the scope of employee participatory rights in
employer-initiated OSHRC hearings, all evidence of congressional intent on




165. See Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products, 622 F.2d at 1189 (Pollak, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (dissent found employer often contests citation because employer
disputes Secretary's finding of violation).
166. See id. (dissent found Secretary's finding often flows from employee complaint which
Secretary must investigate); see also supra note 55 (employees enjoy rights in investigative and
enforcement stages of Act).
167. See 622 F.2d at 1189 (Pollak, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissent
found unlikely that Congress would limit in adjudicatory stage interests Act encourages
employees to monitor at investigative stage).
168. See supra notes 134-62 and accompanying text (evidence of congressional intent in-
dicates Congress intended employees to enjoy full participation at employer-initiated hearings).
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